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Smoking in Africa: 
Low but rising quickly
Smoking tobacco has been much less 
common traditionally in Africa than in 
Europe or North America. But this is 
changing. Africa has become a growth 
market for the tobacco industry, as people 
in the global North have started to smoke 
much less. The prevalence of smoking in 
Europe since the 1990s has dropped by 
one-third, and even further in the Americas 
(44%). Over the same period, smoking 
levels in Africa have increased by over 
50% (Reitsma et al. 2017).1 Africa’s youth, 
in particular, is overrepresented among 
new smokers (N. Ramanandraibe and 
A.E. Ouma 2011; Blecher and Ross 2013). 
This is part of a wider shift in tobacco 
consumption from richer to poorer countries 
– it has been projected that 6.8 million of 
a global total of 8.3 million tobacco-related 
deaths will occur in low- and middle-income 
countries by 2030 (Mathers and Loncar 
2006). Africa is not only facing rising 
health care costs connected to tobacco 
consumption, but also the loss of lives, 
particularly men, as a consequence of 
smoking-related diseases. 
Tobacco taxes to the 
rescue?
Smoking rates in Africa are still low, but 
rising rapidly. This puts African governments 
in a position to take action now to 
dramatically improve health in the coming 
decades (Blecher and Ross 2013; Méndez 
et al. 2013). Alongside measures such 
as restrictions on advertising, information 
campaigns and protecting people from 
second-hand smoke, tobacco taxation has 
been highlighted as the single most effective 
policy tool available to decrease overall 
smoking. Studies suggest that a 10% 
increase in the price of tobacco in low- and 
middle-income countries would be expected 
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to reduce consumption by 5% (National Cancer 
Institute 2017). Article 6 of the WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco notes that ‘price and 
tax measures are an effective and important 
means of reducing tobacco consumption by 
various segments of the population, in particular 
young persons’, and encourages their adoption. 
In addition to generating new revenue, tobacco 
taxes are comparatively cheap to implement, 
at an estimated cost to low- and middle-income 
countries of as little as USD0.05 per capita per 
year (Chisholm et al. 2011). From the different 
types of taxes levied on tobacco products, 
studies have shown that specific excise taxes 
have the most significant effect on raising prices, 
and hence affecting health impacts (Petit and 
Nagy 2016). 
And yet, despite the effectiveness and 
comparatively cheap implementation of 
excise taxes on tobacco products, low- and 
middle-income countries across the globe have 
on average maintained much lower levels of 
tobacco taxation than high-income countries 
(WHO 2020). Although 44 African countries 
have signed up to the WHO Framework 
Convention for Tobacco Control, tobacco 
taxes on the continent remain remarkably 
low. Only three countries across the continent 
(Mauritius, Madagascar and Egypt) met the 
WHO recommended standard of the total share 
of taxes making up at least 75% of the retail 
price in 2019. In fact, cigarettes have actually 
become cheaper over the past decade in more 
than a dozen countries across Africa (WHO 
2020: 145).2 Why are African governments not 
taking the right action?
Tobacco tax and tobacco 
smuggling: Achilles heel 
or Trojan horse?
One of the most common arguments against 
tobacco taxation is the risk that, by increasing the 
price of cigarettes and in particular contributing 
to price differences between countries, tobacco 
taxation could lead to more smuggling of 
tobacco products. This argument rests largely 
on the assumption that smuggling is heavily 
influenced by cross-border price differences, 
and higher taxation increases its profitability. 
In addition to undermining or even eliminating 
the desired revenue effects of tobacco taxes, 
tobacco smuggling poses a risk to a broad 
set of health policies. It lowers the retail price 
of cigarettes, which are frequently distributed 
through unregulated channels and hence more 
easily accessible to children and teenagers 
(Dutta 2019). It also risks financing organised 
crime groups, with a variety of negative knock-on 
effects throughout society. 
Reports commissioned by the tobacco industry 
highlight high levels of tobacco smuggling in 
Africa. Discussions at The Economist’s Illicit 
Trade Summit in Addis Ababa in 2019 indicate 
that 40% of the tobacco sold in Ethiopia was 
imported illegally.3 A study by the Tobacco 
Institute of Southern Africa estimates that in 
2008 smuggled cigarettes made up 20% of the 
market in South Africa, one of the countries 
with relatively high levels of specific excise 
taxes, implying a government revenue loss of 
USD236 million (van Walbeek and Shai 2015). 
These claims highlight the potential scope of this 
argument, but also its main problem – many of 
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these studies come with a significant conflict of 
interest. The Economist’s Illicit Trade Summit 
in Addis Ababa was co-sponsored by Japan 
Tobacco International – who had recently become 
the majority shareholder in Ethiopia’s privatised 
National Tobacco Enterprise.4 The Tobacco 
Institute of Southern Africa represented an 
industry lobbying group, which in a subsequent 
study corrects its estimate for the same year 
down to 7.9% (van Walbeek and Shai 2015).
The usefulness of the bogey man of tobacco 
smuggling for tobacco industry arguments 
against tobacco taxation has led the industry 
to fund a deluge of so-called research and 
analysis. The tobacco industry has a vested 
interest in overstating both the amount of tobacco 
smuggling and the extent to which it is caused 
by taxation – a tendency in industry-funded 
research that has been systematically highlighted 
by independent studies (Gallagher et al. 2019; 
Smith et al. 2013; Chen et al. 2015). ‘Through 
their assiduous efforts over recent years, tobacco 
companies have effectively hijacked the Illicit 
Trade Protocol (…)’ one of these argues, ‘and are 
actively using the threat of illicit [trade] to counter 
tobacco control policies by arguing, misleadingly, 
that tobacco control policies drive increases in 
illicit [trade]’ (Gilmore et al. 2015: 12).
Independent research has been much more 
doubtful of the link between tobacco taxation 
and smuggling. A recent global report by the 
World Bank concludes that ‘contrary to tobacco 
industry arguments, taxes and prices have only a 
limited impact on the illicit cigarette market share 
at country level’ (Dutta 2019). Africa provides 
a fitting illustration of this observation at a 
macro-level, as it has both a low level of tobacco 
taxation and low tobacco prices compared to 
Europe, and higher levels of tobacco smuggling 
in some parts of the continent. Consequently, 
understanding the relationship between tobacco 
taxation and smuggling in Africa requires a 
critical reading of available data, and a focus on 
independent and peer-reviewed research. While 
there is a scarcity of research on these issues in 
Africa compared to other regions, the available 
evidence points to a more complex relationship 
between taxation and smuggling. 
Tobacco taxation and 
tobacco smuggling in 
South Africa
A large number of independent studies on 
tobacco smuggling in the continent focus on 
South Africa. South Africa started to employ a 
3www.ictd.ac
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deliberate tobacco control policy in the 1990s, 
which included a large increase in excise taxes. 
As a consequence, cigarette consumption per 
capita fell by more than 60% by the early 2000s 
(van Walbeek and Shai 2015). Despite the 
rapid increase in taxation, the market share of 
smuggled cigarettes seems to have grown only 
marginally during this time, with independent 
studies finding it substantially lower than tobacco 
industry estimates suggest (Blecher 2010). 
Crucially, it does not appear to have substantially 
undermined the desired revenue and health 
effects of these tax increases. Using a synthetic 
control method to estimate tobacco consumption 
trends in South Africa, a 2017 study directly 
traces the substantial decrease in smoking to 
tax measures (Chelwa et al. 2017). Even as the 
relative market share of smuggled cigarettes 
increased somewhat, actual consumption in both 
the licit and illicit market decreased. Notably, the 
tax revenue from higher excise taxes offset the 
tax losses caused by illicit trade (Blecher 2010).
More recently, however, a set of studies finds 
that the market share of smuggled cigarettes in 
South Africa spikes substantially post-2010, to 
approximately one-third of the market (Vellios et al. 
2019). While there have been relatively small tax 
increases during this time compared to the 1990s, 
and a recent study could find no statistically 
significant effect of the smaller increases on the 
market share of smuggled cigarettes, the case of 
South Africa demonstrates that non-price related 
factors rather than tax increases are driving 
smuggling (Vellios et al. 2019). 
Tax administration and 
enforcement 
Several recent studies in the tobacco control 
literature emphasise that the volume of the 
illicit tobacco trade depends more on tax 
administration than tax levels, and in particular 
the effectiveness of enforcement and tracking 
mechanisms (Joossens and Raw 2003, 2008; 
Chaloupka et al. 2011). This remains a particular 
challenge on the African continent. A study 
of cigarette smuggling in the Southern Africa 
Customs Union highlights the low capacity and 
skill of government agencies across the region 
in combatting the illicit tobacco trade (Eads et 
al. 2019). This is echoed in a related study on 
South Africa, which argues that the high spike 
in tobacco smuggling into South Africa since 
2015 correlates with a ‘turbulent time at the 
South African Revenue Service, when many of 
the enforcement functions were greatly reduced’ 
(Vellios et al. 2019: 1). Conversely, a study of 
cigarette and alcohol prices in the borderlands 
of Botswana highlights that, despite imposing 
higher levies on these goods, Botswana 
managed to limit smuggling through effective 
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customs and border control measures (van 
der Zee and van Walbeek 2019). Similarly, 
evaluations of the implementation of track-and-
trace systems combined with electronic cargo 
monitoring in Kenya highlight the effect that 
strengthening enforcement systems can have on 
limiting smuggling and supporting tax revenue, 
alongside the importance of implementing 
consistent and comprehensive measures. ‘The 
government of Kenya, with its system to control 
the illicit trade in place’, the study concludes, 
‘should not allow the illicit trade to be used as an 
excuse for not pursuing more vigorous tobacco 
tax reform’ (Ross 2019: 582).
While low enforcement capacity and corruption 
in key agencies are both causes of smuggling 
and serious challenges across Africa, they also 
do not exist in a political or economic vacuum. 
A recent study of smuggling in North Africa 
notes that state actors often tolerate smuggling 
economies, not because they are corrupt, but 
because they are economically essential for 
border regions (Gallien 2020; Malik and Gallien 
2019). If income from smuggling economies 
is essential to the livelihood of marginalised 
borderland populations, stricter enforcement 
along borders risks local economic collapse or 
widespread unrest. Here, policies on smuggling 
need to be combined with broader development 
interventions in order to be politically and 
socially acceptable.
Furthermore, economic interests in tobacco 
smuggling and tax evasion go beyond 
bootleggers and small-scale smugglers. As a 
range of recent studies note, large international 
tobacco companies have also at times relied 
on illegal trade channels in order to position 
their products in new markets and evade tax 
and tariff costs, to subvert packaging and price 
regulations, or undermine national monopolies 
(Collin et al. 2004). This further highlights the 
importance of supply-chain control and industry 
monitoring in combatting illicit cigarette trade in 
Africa. 
Delinking tobacco taxation 
and illicit trade in Africa – 
key policy recommendations
The research summarised here strongly 
suggests that the existence of an illicit tobacco 
trade should not discourage policymakers from 
raising taxes on tobacco products. Taxation 
has been shown to be the most effective policy 
tool to limit overall tobacco consumption, and 
its associated human and healthcare costs, 
while also raising revenue. Best practice points 
to the use of specific excise taxes that apply 
equally across all tobacco products, which are 
increased regularly to account for inflation and 
income effects. With very few countries across 
the continent currently taxing tobacco products 
at the 75% of retail price suggested by the 
WHO, there is substantive scope for increased 
tobacco taxation in Africa. If illicit trade levels 
rise as a consequence, they will represent a 
health, revenue and governance threat that 
policymakers need to address. However, the 
increase in illicit trade is neither automatic nor 
inevitable, is unlikely to cancel out either the 
health or revenue effects of higher tobacco 
taxation, and can be avoided through a range 
of other policy tools. A recent report concludes 
that measures to reduce illicit tobacco trade 
and tobacco tax reform, including a significant 
increase in tobacco taxes, should be viewed 
as complementary, helping countries to reduce 
preventable morbidity and mortality, and increase 
www.ictd.ac 5
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public revenue (Dutta 2019). We highlight five 
further policy recommendations below: 
1. Regional cooperation and coordination of 
tobacco tax and price levels is a powerful 
option to weaken the link between tobacco 
tax increases and illicit trade. While price 
differences are only one of a range of 
drivers of the illicit tobacco trade, arbitrage 
opportunities for smugglers at borders can be 
reduced by limiting tax discrepancies between 
neighbouring countries. WHO-recommended 
levels can provide a benchmark for 
coordination. It is important to intensify 
implementation efforts for such coordinated 
measures, for example within ECOWAS, 
and encourage implementation of the WHO 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(FCTC) and Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade 
in Tobacco Products (ITP).
2. Improving control of the tobacco supply chain 
across Africa is a central priority in limiting 
the illicit tobacco trade on the continent. 
This is not limited to borderlands or border 
crossings, but extends from production to 
import and distribution, transit zones and free 
trade zones. Excise stamps and fiscal stickers 
can support supply chain control, however 
best practice calls for more expansive track 
and trace measures. As larger track and 
trace systems typically require a substantive 
infrastructure, a close examination of 
providers is crucial. As highlighted in the 
ITP, tobacco industry involvement in the 
development of this infrastructure should be 
rejected, and products offered by tobacco 
industry actors, such as Codentify, should be 
treated with utmost caution (Ross et al. 2018; 
Gilmore et al. 2019). 
3. Given the still comparatively small but 
growing tobacco market in many African 
countries, policies on tobacco taxation and the 
elimination of the illicit tobacco trade should 
be closely coordinated with wider policies on 
smoking prevention and public education. 
4. Both policy on reforming tobacco taxation 
and countering the illicit tobacco trade should 
be developed with a clear consideration of 
distribution and equity considerations. Recent 
research highlights that tobacco taxation 
should not be considered regressive due to 
its positive health and behavioural effects on 
lower-income households (Fuchs Tarlovsky 
et al. 2019). At the same time, policies to 
counter illegal trade can have distributional 
effects, particularly when they interact with 
marginalised populations in border regions. 
If necessary, policies should be closely 
coordinated with wider developmental policies 
in affected regions. 
5. The structures and causes of smuggling 
are highly context-dependent, and cannot 
be deduced by solely considering price 
and tax information. Policy in this field, and 
particularly in the politically and economically 
diverse context of the African continent, 
should be developed with consideration of 
both the capacity of the tax and enforcement 
institutions, and the market for both legal 
and illicit tobacco – particularly the wide 
set of drivers of illicit trade. The existing 
evidence base on tobacco smuggling 
and consumption in Africa needs to be 
further strengthened to support effective 
policymaking in this context, with a particular 
emphasis on research that is financially 
independent of the tobacco industry.
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